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Abstract
This paper contributes to the literature on …scal equalization in
three ways. First, it shows how two important types of transfer
schemes, the foundation grant and the power equalization grant, can
be seen as two di¤erent interpretations of equal opportunity ethics.
Second, it characterizes versions of these transfers schemes that en-
sure a balanced budget for the central government. Third, it clari…es
the nature of various …scal spillover e¤ects within the framework of
balanced budgets.
1 Introduction
Local jurisdictions within the same country often have di¤erent capacities to
raise revenue and face di¤erent costs of providing public goods and services.
This calls for interregional transfers. Fiscal equalization aims at reconcil-
ing two important political principles in such situations. First, the principle
of …scal capacity compensation, saying that di¤erences in the …scal capacity
among local jurisdiction should be eliminated. Second, the principle of …scal
responsibility, saying that a jurisdiction should be held responsible for the de-
cisions that are under their control, in particular their tax e¤ort. The former
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principle re‡ects a concern for interregional inequalities that are a result of
factors outside the control of the local jurisdictions, whereas the latter prin-
ciple re‡ects a concern for local autonomy. Local tax discretion is seen both
as a way of ensuring local democracy and capturing decentralization gains.
The fundamental challenge for any system of interregional transfers is to sat-
isfy these two principles at the same time. How can the central government
design a transfer system that gives all local jurisdictions equal opportunities
and at the same time holds them responsible for their decisions?
The equal opportunity approach has been predominant in the …scal feder-
alism literature (Boadway and Flatters (1982), Le Grand (1975, 1991), Ladd
and Yinger (1994), Oakland (1994), Mieszkovski and Musgrave (1999)). This
predominance corresponds to a revival of liberal egalitarian, or equal opportu-
nity, theories of justice in the philosophical literature (Rawls (1971), Dworkin
(1981a,b), Sen (1985), Arneson (1989), Cohen (1993), Roemer (1993, 1996),
Fleurbaey (1995a,b) and Bossert and Fleurbaey (1996)). Equal opportunity
ethics in its most general form states that society should indemnify agents
against poor outcomes that are the consequence of factors that are beyond
their control, but not against outcomes that are the consequences of factors
that are within their control (Roemer 1998). An inherent di¢culty faced
by these theories is to determine what factors are under the agents control
and what factors are outside their control. In the context of …scal equaliza-
tion, this amounts to clarifying where the ‘cut’ should be drawn between the
responsibility of the central government and the responsibility of the local
governments. The literature on …scal equalization generally assumes that the
tax base is outside the control of the local governments, but that the tax rate,
or tax e¤ort, is under the control of the local government. We will adopt this
assumption and not pursue a discussion of the justi…cation for this particular
interpretation of local government responsibility.
The focus in the literature on …scal equalization has been on how to
determine the size of the grants given to each jurisdiction. But any grant
scheme needs to be …nanced, and in this paper we explicitly take account
of the central government budget restriction and analyze how the costs of
di¤erent transfer schemes should be distributed between local jurisdictions.
This allows us to study …scal spillover e¤ects among local jurisdictions, that
is, how decisions about the tax level in some jurisdictions a¤ect the tax
burden of other jurisdictions.
Along the lines of much of the …scal federalism literature, we do not
consider incentive e¤ects. This is certainly an important limitation of the
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analysis, and more generally one should (among other things) consider how
a transfer scheme a¤ects the choice of tax rate by the local jurisdictions and
how the tax rate within a local jurisdiction a¤ects the tax base. But in
the spirit of standard economic theory, we want to focus on one particular
aspect of the situation, in this case how various transfers schemes conform
to the basic principles of equal opportunity ethics within the framework of a
balanced government budget.
In sum, this paper contributes to the literature on …scal equalization in
three ways. First, it argues that two important types of transfer schemes in
the …scal federalism literature, the foundation grant and the power equaliza-
tion grant, can be related to two di¤erent interpretations of equal opportunity
ethics. More precisely the paper shows that the di¤erence between the foun-
dation grant system and the power equalization grant system corresponds
to a disagreement about how one interprets the principle of …scal capacity
compensation and the principle of …scal responsibility. The foundation grant
and the power equalization grant do not in general imply balanced central
government budgets, and the second contribution of the paper is to char-
acterize versions of foundation grant and the power equalization grant that
satisfy this requirement. Finally, the paper clari…es the nature of various
…scal spillover e¤ects within the framework of balanced budgets.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we introduce the general
model and the concept of …scal capacity. Sections 3 and 4 analyze foun-
dation grants and power equalization grants respectively, whereas section 5
concludes.
2 The …scal capacity
Consider the following simple model with N local jurisdictions, where we
assume that all jurisdictions are equally sized.1 Each local government i
spends a certain amount, Bi, per capita on public goods and services. The
expenditures are …nanced by a proportional tax, ti, on the tax base Yi and a
transfer from the central government, Ti. The local government expenditures
have to be equal to its revenues Ri. Normalizing the population in each
jurisdiction to unity, the budget constraint of a local government i is given
by Bi = Ri. The revenues in jurisdiction i is given by
1The results can easily be extended to a model with jurisdictions of di¤erent size.
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Ri(t) = tiYi + Ti(t): (1)
where Ti is the interregional transfer and t is the vector of local taxes.
We assume that Ti is di¤erentiable. Total expenditures can be written as
Bi = Gipi, where Gi is the level of public goods and services provided in
jurisdiction i and pi is the price level in the same jurisdiction. Using the
budget constraint we can write the level of public goods and services as a
function of the vector of taxes
Gi(t) =
Ri(t)
pi
: (2)
By assumption the per capita tax base and the unit price of production
are outside the control of the local government, but the tax rate can be set at
their discretion. For any particular tax rate ti, the …scal capacity is de…ned
as the ratio between the level of public goods and services and the tax rate,
Gi(t)=ti, and is a measure of how much tax e¤ort that is needed to achieve a
certain level of public goods and services. A high (low) …scal capacity means
that a jurisdiction can achieve a given level of public goods and services
for a low (high) tax rate. In the base-line case, where there are no central
government transfers, the …scal capacity of jurisdiction i is given by Yi=pi,
i.e. a low …scal capacity re‡ects a small per capita tax base or a high price
level in the jurisdiction. More generally, the …scal capacity will depend on
the structure of the transfer system.
We assume that the central government does not have any external funds.2
Any positive transfer to one jurisdiction must therefore be …nanced by a
negative transfer from other jurisdictions.X
Ti(t) = 0: (3)
Some standard grant formulas violate this condition. However, systems
of transfers that do not satisfy the budget restriction (3) will result in a
de…cit that must, on the margin, be …nanced by a tax levied by the central
government. Consider for example a situation in which the de…cit is …nanced
by a proportional tax, ¿ , levied by the central government on the total tax
base in the country. In this situation we have that
P
Ti(t) = ¿
P
Yi. The
2The model can easily be extended to the case where
P
Ti(t) = M for some M ¸ 0:
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tax levied by the central government would be paid by tax payers resid-
ing in the local jurisdictions, where tax payers in jurisdiction i would pay
¿Yi. The relevant …scal capacity concept in this situations would therefore
be Gi(t)=(ti + ¿ ). To simplify the discussion, but without loss of gener-
ality, we therefore view the transfer Ti as the central government trans-
fer net of taxes levied by the central government on the local tax base.
3 Foundation grants
A standard interpretation of the principle of …scal compensation is that all
jurisdictions choosing a standard tax level should be able to provide the
same level of public goods and services (Ladd and Yinger (1994)). Let us
call this the requirement of equal provision for standard tax. If we denote
the standard tax level by tS, we can write this requirement as Gi(tS; t¡i) =
Gj(tS; t¡j). An intuitive formulation of the principle of …scal responsibility is
the requirement that the local jurisdictions should be held accountable for the
actual consequence of a change in their tax e¤ort. Each jurisdiction should
thus receive the marginal increase in revenue resulting from an increase in its
tax rate. We will name this the marginal revenue responsibility requirement,
which can be written as @Ri(t)=@ti = Yi.3
A much discussed transfer scheme, the foundation grant, satis…es both
these two requirements. The general foundation grant formula can be de-
scribed as
T Fi (t) = piGS ¡ tSYi: (4)
As is easily seen from (1) and (2), this transfer scheme ensures …scal
equalization in the sense that all jurisdictions choosing a standard tax rate,
tS , get the same level of public goods and services provision, GS. Moreover,
(4) implies that each jurisdiction gets the marginal revenue Yi when changing
the tax rate.
However, the foundation grant formula in (4) does not in general satisfy
the central government budget restriction. Clearly, we cannot expect a bal-
anced budget if GS and tS are determined independent of each other. Given
3See also Bossert and Fleurbaey (1996), who introduce similar principles in a more
general framework.
5
a balanced budget constraint, the grant formula must therefore be based ei-
ther on a standard level of public goods and services or on a standard tax
rate. Assuming that we start by setting a public goods and services level GS ,
this level de…nes, together with the budget constraints at the local and at
the national level, a unique tax rate, t¤. We …nd this tax rate by aggregating
the local constraints X
piGS =
X
(t¤Yi + Ti(t¤)):
Rearranging we get
GS
X
pi = t¤
X
Yi +
X
Ti(t¤):
Finally, using the national budget constraint (3), we …nd that
t¤ = GS
¹p
¹Y
; (5)
where ¹p =
P
pi=N and ¹Y =
P
Yi=N , i.e. the tax must be equal to
the total expenditures required to …nance the standard service level in all
jurisdictions divided by the total tax base. Substituting t¤ for tS in (4) we
can establish the balanced foundation grant
TBFi (t) = piGS ¡ t¤Yi;
or
TBFi (t) = GS¹p(
pi
¹p ¡
Yi
¹Y
): (6)
If we compare the balanced foundation grant formula (6) with the general
foundation formula (4), we should notice that it is no longer the absolute level
of prices and the absolute tax base that matters. By taking into account
the overall budget constraint in the economy, we can see that the relevant
parameters determining the size of the interregional transfer are the relative
price level and the relative size of the tax base compared to other local
jurisdictions.
The size of the standard level of public goods and services provision is
clearly the focal question within such a transfer system. A high (low) GS
favours jurisdictions with a small (large) tax base and a high (low) price
level. Public deliberation is certainly needed in order to settle this question,
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so let us here only brie‡y point out some possibilities. One might argue that
the standard should re‡ect what is considered a minimum level of public
goods and services provision in a jurisdiction or one might defend the view
that what is presently the average public goods and services provision in the
relevant jurisdictions is a reasonable standard for an interregional transfer
system.
We can attain an equivalent expression of the balanced foundation grant
by taking a standard tax rate as the starting point. For a given standard
tax rate we can derive the only public goods and services level that ensures
a balanced budget as
G¤ = tS
¹Y
¹p
: (7)
In this case, the balanced foundation grant can be written as
T BFi = piG
¤ ¡ tSYi;
or
T BFi = t
S ¹Y (
pi
¹p
¡ Yi¹Y ): (8)
The determination of the standard tax rate is the crucial question in
this expression of the balanced foundation grant. Again there are di¤erent
possibilities, where two alternatives are to set the standard tax rate equal to
what is considered to be a minimum tax e¤ort or equal to the average tax
rate in the jurisdictions.
To illustrate the link between the general and the balanced foundation
grant, we can describe the balanced foundation grant as having two parts.
The …rst part re‡ects the idea that GS and tS are determined independently,
that is, everyone receives a transfer determined by the general foundation
grant. This generates a de…cit (or a surplus), and the second part makes
sure that this de…cit (or surplus) is distributed among jurisdictions in a way
that implies that jurisdictions choosing the standard tax rate tS attain the
public goods and services level G¤ (as determined by (7)).
To see this, rewrite (8) in the following way
T BFi = piG
S ¡ tSYi ¡ pi(GS ¡G¤):
By substituting for G¤ and rearranging we get
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TBFi = T
F
i ¡ piP pjD(GS; tS ); (9)
where
D(GS; tS) =
X
(pjGS ¡ tSYj) (10)
is the total cost (or surplus) associated with (4).
The foundation grant satis…es the requirement of equal provision for stan-
dard tax, which demands equalization of …scal capacity for one level of tax
e¤ort. But it allows di¤erences at all other levels. Hence, it can be argued
that the foundation grant relies on too weak a concept of …scal capacity
compensation, and we now turn to a more ambitious attempt to secure …scal
equalization.
4 Power equalization grants
It has been argued that local governments should have the same opportu-
nities, or power, to provide public goods and services for all levels of tax
e¤ort (Le Grand 1975, 1991). Let us name this the requirement of equal
provision for equal tax, i.e. for any two local jurisdictions i and j, if ti = tj;
then Gi(ti; t¡i) = Gj(tj; t¡j) . This requirement is a stronger, and arguably
a better, interpretation of the principle of …scal capacity compensation than
the requirement of equal provision for standard tax.
The foundation grant clearly violates the requirement of equal provision
for equal tax. More generally this requirement is not compatible with the
requirement of marginal revenue responsibility unless all jurisdictions have
the same …scal capacity.4 However, if we give up marginal revenue respon-
sibility, then there are many transfer schemes satisfying equal provision for
equal tax. The most well-known is the general power equalization grant
T PEi = piti(
Y R
pR
¡ Yi
pi
); (11)
where Y RpR describes the …scal capacity of a standard or reference juris-
diction, characterized by a standard tax base, Y R and a standard price level
4This result is formally proved in a more general setting in Bossert and Fleurbaey
(1996).
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pR. The power equalization grant transfers resources so as to imitate a sit-
uation in which all local jurisdictions face the same reference tax base and
reference price level. In other words, the aim is to treat all jurisdictions as
if they were identical with respect to those factors that are outside their
control, where the public goods provision within each jurisdiction is given by
Gi = ti Y
R
pR . Even though this grant formula is strongly egalitarian, it should
be clearly distinguished from the equalization of public goods provision as
such. Di¤erent levels of public goods provision is compatible with …scal ca-
pacity equalization as long it results from di¤erences in tax e¤ort and not
from di¤erences in …scal capacity.
As long as the jurisdictions di¤er in …scal capacity, there does not exist
any reference …scal capacity for which the power-equalization grant formula
in (11) will ensure that the central government budget restriction is satis…ed.
In general, within such a system, there will be a de…cit or a surplus to be
distributed among the jurisdictions. How should this be done? One inter-
esting approach is to argue that a change in the tax rate in one jurisdiction
should have the same e¤ect on the service level in all other jurisdictions. We
can name this idea the requirement of equal e¤ect
@Gj
@ti
=
@Gk
@ti
;8j; k 6= i:
It turns out that the only group of balanced budget transfer schemes that
satis…es the requirement of equal e¤ect and the requirement of equal provision
of equal tax is equivalent to the version of power equalization grant that
ensures a balanced budget.5 The balanced power equalization grant formula
can be described as follows
T BPEi = piti(
Y R
pR
¡ Yi
pi
)¡ piP
pj
D(Y R; pR); (12)
where D(Y R; pR) =
P
pjtj(Y
R
pR ¡ Yjpj ).
To what extent does the balanced power equalization grant satisfy the
principle of …scal responsibility? Clearly, as long as Y R=pR > 0; the public
service level in a local jurisdiction will depend on their tax e¤ort. Thus, (12)
satis…es what we might consider a minimum requirement of …scal responsi-
bility, to wit that there is a positive reward for the local jurisdiction from an
5This group of distribution mechanisms is characterized by Cappelen and Tungodden
(2003). It was introduced in Bossert and Fleurbaey (1996).
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increase in tax e¤ort. Of course, the size of this reward will depend on the
choice of reference …scal capacity, Y R=pR, and hence an important question
within this framework is how to determine Y R and pR.
One way to approach this question is to place further restrictions on the
type of e¤ects that we allow an increase in the tax rate of one jurisdiction
to have on the tax revenue of other jurisdictions (Tungodden (2001)) and
Cappelen and Tungodden (2002)). It could be argued that no jurisdiction
should be worse o¤ from the fact that another jurisdiction decides to increase
its tax level. It can be shown that the balanced power equalization grant only
satis…es this requirement if the reference …scal capacity equals the lowest
…scal capacity among the jurisdictions, i.e. if Y RpR = min
n
Y1
p1
; :::; Ynpn
o
. In
this case, no jurisdiction is rewarded with more than their actual increase
in purchasing power when they change tax e¤ort, and hence there is never
a de…cit to be distributed among the remaining jurisdictions. Alternatively,
one could argue that no jurisdiction should bene…t from an increase in the
tax rate in another jurisdiction. This requirement can only be satis…ed if
the reference …scal capacity equals the highest …scal capacity among the
jurisdictions, i.e. if Y
R
pR = max
n
Y1
p1 ; :::;
Yn
pn
o
. This reference …scal capacity
ensures that no jurisdiction is rewarded with less than their actual increase
in purchasing power when they change tax e¤ort, and hence there is never
a surplus to be distributed among the jurisdictions. A third possibility is
to use the average …scal capacity, Y RpR =
¹Y
¹p , as the reference capacity. One
appealing feature of this approach is that it can be said to be neutral between
di¤erent levels of tax e¤ort in the following sense. Consider a situation in
which all jurisdictions either choose a high or a low tax e¤ort and in which
the average …scal capacity of those who exercise a low tax e¤ort is the same as
the average …scal capacity of those who exercise a high tax e¤ort. A transfer
system is neutral between di¤erent tax levels only if it does not imply a net
transfer between these two groups in this situation. It can be shown that the
only reference level that ensures neutrality in this sense is the average …scal
capacity.
The balanced power equalization grant satis…es the requirement of equal
e¤ect and distributes the costs of any transfer scheme equally among all
jurisdictions. However, it might be argued that the distribution of such costs
somehow should be related to the tax rates set by the di¤erent jurisdictions.
By way of illustration, an alternative way to distribute costs imposed by the
unbalanced power equalization grant (11) is to distribute them proportional
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to the tax base, Yi, in each jurisdiction. This is how the costs would be
distributed if it were …nanced by a proportional tax levied by the central
government on the total tax base in the country, i.e. if
P
Ti = ¿
P
Yi. Such
a transfer scheme is described by the following formula
~Ti = piti(
Y R
pR
¡ Yi
pi
)¡ Yi¹Y
1
N
D(Y R; pR) (13)
where D(Y R; pR) =
P
pjtj(Y
R
pR ¡ Yjpj ). This transfer scheme violates the
requirement of equal provision for equal tax. Jurisdictions with an above av-
erage tax base receive less tax revenues for a given tax rate than jurisdictions
with a lower tax base. Furthermore, the second part of (13) does not take
into account di¤erences in price levels, and hence jurisdictions with high costs
of providing public services would not be able to provide the same amount
of public service as jurisdictions with the same tax rate and tax base but
with lower costs of providing services. In sum, this implies that if a power
equalization grant is …nanced by a proportional tax levied by the central gov-
ernment the system as a whole would violate the requirement that motivated
the transfer formula in the …rst place.
5 Concluding remarks
This paper has analyzed the tension between interregional equalization and
local autonomy. In particular we have argued that two important grant
formulas, the foundation grant and the power equalization grant, can be
seen as expressions of di¤erent versions of the principle of …scal capacity
compensation and the principle of …scal responsibility. The foundation grant
satis…es a weak interpretation of the principle of …scal capacity compensation,
the equal provision for standard tax requirement, and a strong interpretation
of the principle of …scal responsibility, the marginal revenue responsibility
requirement. The power equalization grant on the other hand satis…es a
stronger interpretation of the principle of …scal capacity compensation, the
requirement of equal provision for equal tax, and a weaker interpretation of
the principle of responsibility.
Neither the general foundation grant formula nor the general power equal-
ization grant formula balances the central government budgets. However, in
order to avoid a partial analysis of …scal equalization, we need to take the
central government restriction into account. In this paper we have shown how
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to modify both schemes in this respect. Within this more general framework,
we have clari…ed (among other things) (a) that in a discussion of interregional
transfers, one should focus on relative, not absolute, price and tax base lev-
els; (b) that in a discussion of foundation grant, one cannot determine the
standard level of public goods and services and the standard tax rate in-
dependently; and (c) that in a discussion of power equalization grant, one
may approach the question about reference …scal capacity by focusing on the
nature of the spillover e¤ects generated by the central government budget
constraint.
We have ignored incentive considerations in order to focus on how dif-
ferences in tax e¤ort can justify interregional inequality. An important ex-
tension would be to analyze a model in which incentive considerations inter-
act with considerations of interregional equity. It would also be of interest
to make an empirical application of this framework, by comparing existing
interregional transfer schemes and study to what extent they ensure …scal
equalization according to the various interpretations discussed in this paper.
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